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Abstract 
We investigate the rationality of an exclusive supply contract for Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) between one of the two largest aircraft 
manufacturers in the world, Boeing, and a Japanese CFRP supplier, Toray. It appears irrational that in 2004 Boeing dared to choose Toray as the 
sole CFRP supplier for their new B787 aircraft, and exclude other CFRP suppliers for the next 18 years, instead of letting several suppliers 
compete on price. On the basis of game theory, we build a mathematical model of the market for CFRP comprising Toray and the oligopolistic 
market for aircraft, assuming the other huge aircraft manufacturer, Airbus, as Boeing’s rival. Consequently, we derive subgame perfect Nash 
equilibria using backward induction and observe its outcome. The results show that under specific conditions, such a contract can be a rational 
strategy by both companies, Boeing and Toray. In the model, an aircraft is defined as a product consisting of two materials, CFRP and aluminum. 
Two decision stages about production by Boeing and Airbus are done sequentially. In each stage, the amount of CFRP is first determined by the 
market and then the manufacturer determines the amount of aluminum. However, in advance of this stage Toray has been given a chance to 
propose the amount of CFRP for the case of exclusive supply. In order to be chosen as the exclusive supplier, Toray should propose the total 
amount of CFRP which are produced by both suppliers in the Cournot competitive market. It implies that Toray has an incentive to discount the 
price of CFRP from desirable price for purely monopolized market. Thus, designating a supplier as the exclusive one is rational action for 
manufacturers because it creates the possibility to make the price of material lower.   
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Scientific Committee of 48th CIRP Conference on MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS - CIRP CMS 
2015.
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1. Introduction 
Carbon fiber, produced from heat-treated organic carbon, is 
usually epoxy coated and then baked to make a complex 
material called Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP). CFRP 
is lightweight and has high mechanical strength in one-tenth the 
volume of steel; i.e., it has the same strength has steel but less 
weight. In addition, because it is not metal, it does not corrode, 
has various means for chemical resistance, and is easy to 
maintain. Further, when burned, it can easily change its nature 
by combining with various kinds of plastic. 
These properties are invaluable for the aviation industry in 
the production of aircraft. Consequently, it has been utilized 
since the 1970s—at first only for a part of the tail unit in Boeing 
B737s and B767s. Subsequently, in the 1990s, it was 
additionally utilized in the main wing. 
In the 2000s, Boeing and Airbus began to utilize CFRP for 
virtually the entire body of their aircraft and competed to 
develop new aircraft using CFRP; ultimately resulting in 
Boing’s B787 and Airbus’ A350XWB flagship mid-range 200–
300-seater aircraft being predominantly composed of CFRP. 
Because these aircraft expend less fuel than previous models, 
they are able to fly as long as larger aircraft. These changes 
made it possible to extend the line from Asia to Europe and 
America, where the flight time was previously considered too 
long to be profitable. Consequently, CFRP is now the main 
material for aircrafts. 
The Japanese producers of CFRP, Toray, Toho Tenax, and 
Mitsubishi Rayon, occupy 70% of the total world market and 
are therefore the main players. The turning point came in 2006 
when Boeing signed the exclusive contract to source CFRP 
only from Toray. After 18 years, Toray has become a monopoly 
provider of CFRP to Boeing. Usually, in a monopoly situation, 
 2015 The Authors. Published by lsevier . . This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- d/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the scientifi c committee of 48th CIRP Conference on MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS - CIRP CMS 2015
1044   Kenju Akai et al. /  Procedia CIRP  41 ( 2016 )  1043 – 1048 
prices are higher than in a competitive situation with rivals. In 
addition, there is a high risk of the supply of material becoming 
limited. Thus, the exclusive contract appeared to be a bad deal 
for Boeing. 
Airbus’ strategy is opposite to that of Boeing. It procured the 
CFRP for A350XWB from four CFRP suppliers: Hexel and 
Cytec in the US, and Toray and Toho Tenax in Japan. Thus, 
Toray was only one of their suppliers. 
Hax [1] proposed a customer relationship-focused company 
strategy called delta mode. The model propounds “system lock-
in,” in which firms impound customers and exclude rivals from 
the market to obtain the position of leader and competitive 
superiority in that market. Okamura [2] reported that Boeing’s 
exclusive contract with Toray is an application of that system 
lock-in principle. Because Toray’s CFRP is exclusively used by 
Boeing, Toray can attain the position of trusted brand and 
become the leader in the CFRP market. Additionally, Toray 
receives merit for cost reduction from expanding production 
and enhancing the quality of specialized aircrafts.  
The exact details of the contract signed between Boeing and 
Toray are confidential, and hence unknown by us. Therefore, 
we focus on the monetary incentive for both parties to sign this 
exclusive contract. That is, our goal is to mathematically 
analyze the rationality of the exclusive contract of Boeing with 
Toray from the aspect of monetary profits, i.e., economic 
incentive. We utilize game theory, which mathematically 
analyzes a firm’s strategy which maximize its profits 
considering rival’s strategy and profits.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 
2 describes the model used in our analysis. Section 3 analyzes 
the optimal solution in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
Section 4 concludes this paper. 
2. Model description and notations 
2.1. Game construction 
For this model, we assume that two firms—Toray and its 
rival—provide the same quality CFPR. Further, there are two 
aircraft firms: Boeing and Airbus. The respective number of 
aircrafts produced by Boeing and Airbus is defined as ܳ஻, ܳ஺,
respectively. The new types of aircraft are almost all produced 
from aluminium and CFRP. Therefore, this study assumes the 
production function of an aircraft, ܳ௜ , is a combination of 
CFRP ܭ௜, and aluminium ܣ௜.
ܳ௜ ൌ ܽሼߙܭ௜ ൅ ሺͳ െ ߙሻܣ௜ሽǡ ߙ ൐
ͳ
ʹ
(1)
where ܽ  is the proportionality coefficient and ߙ  is the 
technological coefficient. Because CFRP comprises more than 
half of all materials in the new aircraft, we set Į as shown above. 
The price of an aircraft is determined to be that of market price, 
which is defined as the reduction function of total quantity 
produced by the firms. This total quantity is defined as 
ܳ ൌ ܳ஻ ൅ ܳ஺. We define the highest price as ଴ܲ if there is no 
supply, ܳ ൌ Ͳ. Then, the market price is determined as  
ܲሺܳሻ ൌ ଴ܲ െ ܳܳ ൏ ଴ܲ    (2)
ܲሺܳሻ ൌ Ͳǡ         (3)
Fig. 1. Decision-making game tree. 
In this game, we consider the sequential game stages shown 
in Fig. 1.  
First sequence: Boeing phase 
x Stage 1: Toray decides whether to offer a monopolized 
contract to Boeing. 
x Stage 2: Boeing either accepts or rejects the offer. If it is 
rejected, Toray needs to compete with its rivals to sell 
CFRP.
x Stage 3: Toray decides how many units of CFRP to 
provide to Boeing. 
x Stage 4: The rival firm decides how many units of CFRP 
to provide to Boeing. 
x Stage 5: Boeing decides how many units of aluminium to 
use. 
Second sequence: Airbus phase 
x Stage 6: Toray decides how many units of CFRP to 
provide to Airbus. 
x Stage 7: The rival firm decides how many units of CFRP 
to provide to Airbus. 
x Stage 8: Airbus decides how many units of aluminium to 
use. 
 Boeing’s 787 action plan started from 2002, which is earlier 
than that of Airbus’ A350XWB in 2006. To build this history 
into the model for the competition between aircraft 
manufacturers, Boeing first decides ܳ஻  and then Airbus 
decides ܳ஺. This game is a kind of Stackelberg game between 
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Boeing and Airbus from the aspect of aircraft production. The 
CFRP is rare material for aircraft manufacturers so that Toray 
can offer to Boeing. It is also a Stackelberg game between 
Toray and Boeing from the aspect of CFRP production.  
2.2 Boeing phase 
In the Boeing phase, the price of CFRP, ݌, is reduction function 
of production of CFRP described as below  
ܲሺܭ஻ሻ ൌ ݌଴ െ ܭ஻ (4)
We define the highest price as ݌଴ if there is no supply, ܭ ൌ Ͳ.
The amount of CFRP from Toray to Boeing is ܭ்஻, and that 
from the rival is ܭோ஻ . Thus, the total amount of CFRP for 
Boeing is ܭ஻ ൌ ܭ்஻ ൅ ܭோ஻ . Each firm incurs the following 
cost, C,  for producing CFRP: 
ܥሺܭ௜஻ሻ ൌ ܿܭ௜஻ǡ ݅ א ሼܶǡ ܤሽ    (5)
There is no fixed cost and the marginal cost is constant, ܿ.
In the Boeing phase, the CFRP suppliers obtain the following 
profits: 
ߨ௜஻ ൌ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஻ሻܭ௜஻ െ ܿܭ௜஻ (6)
The total cost for Boeing to use CFRP is 
ܥሺܭ஻ሻ ൌ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஻ሻܭ஻ (7)
The cost to Boeing of using aluminium 
ܣ஻ is 
ܥሺܣ஻ሻ ൌ ݓܣ஻       (8)
That is, there is no fixed cost and the marginal cost ݓ  is 
constant. Then, the profits obtained by Boeing are as follows: 
ߨ஻ ൌ ሺ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ ܳ஺ሻܳ஻ െ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஻ሻܭ஻ െ ݓܣ஻ (9)
In the Boeing phase, at the first node before Boeing makes its 
decision, Toray has a chance to offer an exclusive contract to 
Boeing. The amount of CFRP Toray provides to Boeing is, ܭഥ்஻
which is predetermined in the contract. 
Boeing has a chance to accept this offer or reject it to obtain 
the CFRP from the competing market. The decision-making by 
Toray at this stage is represented as ܯ஻. If the offer is accepted, 
ܯ஻ ൌ ͳ, Toray necessarily provides ܭഥ்஻ and Boeing does not 
buy any CFRP from the rival so that  ܭோ஻ ൌ Ͳ. Otherwise, 
following pre-described steps, Toray needs to compete with its 
rival in the market to provide it to the aircraft firms. In this case, 
Toray and the rival decide on the amounts of CFRP 
simultaneously. This is called a Cournot quantity competition 
game. This model is represented as a situation in which no 
leading company exists and only a few providers compete with 
each other in a new market. 
2.3 Airbus phase 
The cost and profit functions for Airbus are exactly the same as 
those for Boeing. In the Airbus phase, we define the CFRP 
produced by Toray and the rival, ܭ்஺  and ܭோ஺ , respectively. 
The price of CFRP is defined as  
ܲሺܭ஺ሻ ൌ ݌଴ െ ܭ஺ (10)

The cost of producing CFRP for the CFPR firm to Airbus is 
defined as 
ܥሺܭ௜஺ሻ ൌ ܿܭ௜஺ǡ ݅ א ሼܶǡ ܤሽ (11)
This is the same as that to Boeing. 
Note that there are two situations in this phase—respectively 
associated with acceptance or rejection of Toray’s offer.  
 First, if Boeing accepts the offer, Toray becomes the market 
leader and this market becomes a Stackelberg competition. 
This model setting is represented as a situation in which Boeing 
signs the contract, and Toray joins the Boeing 787 action plan 
monopoly and obtains the know-how to be the leader in the 
CFRP market in the Airbus phase. 
On the other hand, if Boeing rejects it, Toray cannot become 
the leader and they compete as in the same situation, which is 
the Cournot competition. As a result of competition in the 
Boeing phase, both firms obtain the same level of know-how 
simultaneously and there is no leader in this phase. Thus, each 
firm obtains the profits below: 
ߨ௜஺ ൌ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஺ሻܭ௜஺ െ ܿܭ௜஺ (12)
 The cost to Airbus of using CFRP, ܭ஺ is 
ܥሺܭ஺ሻ ൌ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஺ሻܭ஺ (13)
                                
 The cost for using aluminium AA   is the same as that for 
Boeing:  
ܥሺܣ஺ሻ ൌ ݓܭ஺ (14)
, where ݓ is the marginal cost function and it is constant. 
Thus, the profit obtained by Airbus is given by. 
ߨ஺ ൌ ሺ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ ܳ஺ሻܳ஺ െ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஺ሻܭ஺ െ ݓܣ஺ (15)
Throughout these two phases, the total profit obtained by each 
CFRP firm is a summation of the profit in each phase:   
ߨ௜ ൌ ߨ௜஻ ൅ ߨ௜஺ (16)
2.3. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
The Nash equilibrium is defined as follows: 
Definition: A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if the 
profits induced from that strategy are not less than that from 
another strategy for every player.
On the basis of this definition, the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium is defined as follows: 
Definition: A strategy profile is a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium if it becomes a Nash equilibrium in any subgame 
(stage). 
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To analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we 
analyze the firms’ behaviors in backward. In other words, we 
first analyze their behavior in the Airbus phase and then in the 
Boeing phase. In each phase, we first consider aircraft 
manufacturer and then move on to the CFRP suppliers. 
3. Analysis 
3.1. Exclusive contract case  
   By using backward induction, we first solve the Nash 
equilibrium in the Airbus phase for the case where the 
exclusive contract is signed. First we solve optimal 
ሺܭ஻ǡ ܣ஻ǡ ܭ஺ሻ to maximize the profits for Airbus ߨ஺.
 ߨ஺ ൌ െܽଶሺͳ െ ܽሻଶܣ஺ଶ െ ܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻߙܭ஺ܣ஺
൅ ܽሺ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ ܽߙܭሻሺͳ െ ߙሻܣ஺
൅ ܽሺ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ ܽߙܭ஺ሻܭ஺ െ ሺ݌଴
െ ܭ஺ሻܭ஺ െ ݓܣ஺
(17)
Solving 
பగಲ
ப஺ಲ
ൌ Ͳ , the best response function for Airbus to 
ܭ஻ǡ ܣ஻ǡ ܭ஺ is  
ܴሺܣ஺ሻ ൌ
ͳ
ʹܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
൜െʹܽߙܭ஺ ൅ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻
െ
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ
(18)
Next, we solve the optimal solution of CFRP for Toray and 
the rival to maximize their profits. In this case, Toray can be 
the leader in the market because it obtains know-how as a result 
of the exclusive contract in the Boeing phase. Therefore, we 
solve the Stackelberg Nash equilibrium in this game. 
 First we solve the optimal quantity of CFRP, ܭோ஺, the rival 
maximize its profits, given Toray’s strategy ܭ்஺.
ߨோ஺ ൌ െܭோ஺ଶ ൅ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ்஺ െ ܿሻܭோ஺ (19)
Solving 
பగೃಲ
ப௄ೃಲ
ൌ Ͳ, the best response function for the rival to 
Toray is 
ܴሺܭோ஺ሻ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ்஺ െ ܿሻ (20)
To maximize Toray’s profit after considering this best response 
function.  
 ߨ்஺ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ்஺ െ ܿሻܭ்஺ (21)
Solving 
பగ೅ಲ
ப௄೅ಲ
ൌ Ͳ, the optimal solution for Toray is 
ܭ்஺כ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (22)
Applying the solution above, we obtain the solution for the 
rival, 
ܭோ஺כ ൌ
ͳ
Ͷ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (23)
Then,  
ܭ஺כ ൌ
͵
Ͷ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (24)
Thus, Toray and the rival obtain the following profits: 
ߨ்஺ ൌ
ͳ
ͺ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻଶ (25)
ߨோ஺ ൌ
ͳ
ͳ͸
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻଶ (26)
Therefore, we obtain the best response function as 
ܴሺܳ஺ሻ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
൜ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ (27)
Next, we consider Boeing phase to solve ܣ஻ to maximize ߨ஻,
given ܭ஻ and ܴሺܳ஺ሻ:
 ߨ஻ ൌ െ
ͳ
ʹ
ܽଶሺͳ െ ܽሻଶܣ஻ଶ ൅ ሼെܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻߙܭ஻
൅
ͳ
ʹ
ܽሺͳ െ ܽሻ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ʹ
ݓሽܣ஻
൅
ͳ
ʹ
ܽߙሼ ଴ܲ െ ܽߙܭ஻
൅
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ܽሻ
ݓሽܭ஻ െ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஻ሻܭ஻
(28)
Solving 
பగಳ
ப஺ಳ
ൌ Ͳ , we obtain the best response function for 
Boeing using aluminium to the CFRP from Toray and the rival. 
ܴሺܣ஻ሻ ൌ െ
ߙ
ͳ െ ߙ
ܭ஻ ൅
ͳ
ʹܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ ଴ܲ
െ
ͳ
ʹܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻଶ
ݓ
(29)
Next, we solve for the quantity of CFRP produced by Toray 
and its rival in the Boeing phase. If Toray and Boeing sign the 
exclusive contract, each quantity changes as follows. 
ܭ்஻כ ൌ ܭഥ்஻, ܭோ஻כ ൌ Ͳ, ܭ஻כ ൌ ܥ    (30)
Then, each firm obtains the following profits: 
ߨ்஻ ൌ ሺ ଴ܲ െ ܭഥ்஻ሻܭഥ்஻ െ ܿܭഥ்஻ (31)
ߨோ஻ ൌ Ͳ (32)
The optimal solution of aluminium for Boeing is 
ܣ஻כ ൌ െ
ߙ
ͳ െ ߙ
ܭഥ்஻ ൅
ͳ
ʹܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ ଴ܲ
െ
ͳ
ʹܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻଶ
ݓ (33)
Using the solutions above, the optimal aircraft solution for 
Boeing is 
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ܳ஻כ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
൜ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ (34)
On the other hand, the optimal aircraft solution for Airbus is 
ܳ஺כ ൌ
ͳ
Ͷ
൜ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ (35)
Thus, Boeing and Toray obtain the following profits in the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: 
ߨ஻ ൌ ܭഥ்஻ ቀܭഥ்஻ ൅ ݓ
ߙ
ͳ െ ߙ
െ ݌଴ቁ
൅
ͳ
ͺ
൜ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ߙሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ
ଶ (36)
ߨ் ൌ ሺ݌଴ െ ܿ െ ܭഥ்஻ሻܭഥ்஻ ൅
ͳ
ͺ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻଶ (37)
3.2. Non-exclusive contract case  
Let us now solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the 
case where Boeing rejects the exclusive contract with Toray. 
First, we consider Airbus phase to solve for the optimal ܣ஺ to 
maximize its profits, given  ሺܭ஻ǡ ܣ஻ǡ ܭ஺ሻ.
 ߨ஺ ൌ െܽଶሺͳ െ ܽሻଶܣ஺ଶ െ ܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻߙܭ஺ܣ஺
൅ ܽሺ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ ܽߙܭሻሺͳ െ ߙሻܣ஺
൅ ܽሺ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ ܽߙܭ஺ሻܭ஺ െ ሺ݌଴
െ ܭ஺ሻܭ஺ െ ݓܣ஺
(38)
Solving 
பగಲ
ப஺ಲ
ൌ Ͳ , we obtain the best response function of 
Airbus using aluminium to the CFRP from Toray and the rival: 
ܴሺܣ஺ሻ ൌ
ߙ
ʹܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
൜െʹܽߙܭ஺ ൅ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻
൅
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ
(39)
Next, we solve for the optimal production of CFRP for each 
firm in the Airbus phase. In this case, because there is no leader, 
they compete in a Cournot competition. Thus, they 
simultaneously make their decision without knowing each 
other’s production. We solve the optimal production ܭ்஺ for 
Toray to maximize its profits ߨ்஺, given the rival’s production 
ܭோ஺.
 ߨ்஺ ൌ െܭ்஺ଶ ൅ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭோ஺ െ ܿሻܭ்஺ (40)
Solving 
பగ೅ಲ
ப௄೅ಲ
ൌ Ͳ, we obtain 
ܭ்஺ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܭோ஺ െ ܿሻ (41)
On the other hand, the best response function of the rival to 
Toray is maximizing the profit below 
 ߨோ஺ ൌ െܭோ஺ଶ ൅ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ்஺ െ ܿሻܭோ஺ (42)
           
Solving 
பగೃಲ
ப௄ೃಲ
ൌ Ͳ, we obtain 
ܭோ஺ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ்஺ െ ܿሻ (43)
The Nash equilibrium satisfies the relation equations (41) and 
(43) such that we obtain the solution below: 
ܭ்஺כ ൌ ܭோ஺כ ൌ
ͳ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (44)
ܭ஺כ ൌ
ʹ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (45)
Then, Toray and the rival obtain the profits below: 
ߨ்஺ ൌ ߨோ஺ ൌ
ͳ
ͻ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻଶ (46)
Using  ܴሺܣ஺ሻ  and ܭ஺כ , given ሺܭ஻ǡ ܣ஻ሻ , we obtain the best 
response function ܴሺܳ஺ሻ:
ܴሺܳ஺ሻ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
൜ ଴ܲ െ ܳ஻ െ
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ (47)
Next we consider Boeing phase to solve for the optimal ܣ஻ to 
maximize ߨ஻  for any ܭ஻ , given the best response function 
above.
 ߨ஻ ൌ െ
ͳ
ʹ
ܽଶሺͳ െ ܽሻଶܣ஻ଶ ൅ ሼെܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻߙܭ஻
൅
ͳ
ʹ
ܽሺͳ െ ܽሻ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ʹ
ݓሽܣ஻
൅
ͳ
ʹ
ܽߙሼ ଴ܲ െ ܽߙܭ஻
൅
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ܽሻ
ݓሽܭ஻ െ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ஻ሻܭ஻
(48)
Solving 
பగಳ
ப஺ಳ
ൌ Ͳ, we obtain the best response function ܴሺܣ஻ሻ:
ܴሺܣ஻ሻ ൌ
ߙ
ͳ െ ߙ
ܭ஻ ൅
ͳ
ʹܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ ଴ܲ
െ
ͳ
ʹܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻଶ
ݓ
(49)
Next, we solve for the optimal quantity of CFRP produced by 
Toray and its rival in the Boeing phase. In this phase, Boeing 
does not sign the exclusive contract; consequently, both CFRP 
firms compete to produce quantities in a Cournot competition. 
First, we solve for the optimal ܭ்஻ for Toray to maximize ߨ்஻,
given the rival’s production ܭோ஻.
 ߨ்஻ ൌ െܭ்஻ଶ ൅ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭோ஻ െ ܿሻܤ (50)
Solving 
பగ೅ಳ
ப௄೅ಳ
ൌ Ͳ, we obtain 
ܭ்஻ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܭோ஻ െ ܿሻ (51)
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In addition, we solve for the rival’s optimal production ܭோ஻ to 
maximize ߨோ஻, given ܭ்஻.
 ߨோ஻ ൌ െܭோ஻ଶ ൅ ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ்஻ െ ܿሻܭோ஻ (52)
Solving 
பగೃಳ
ப௄ೃಳ
ൌ Ͳ, we obtain 
ܭோ஻ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܭ்஻ െ ܿሻ (53)
The Nash equilibrium is a solution to the relation equations (51) 
and (53). We obtain the solution below. 
ܭ்஻כ ൌ ܭோ஻כ ൌ
ͳ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (54)
ܭ஻כ ൌ
ʹ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (55)
Thus, Toray and the rival obtain the profits below. 
ߨ்஻ ൌ ߨோ஻ ൌ
ͳ
ͻ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻଶ (56)
By using the result above, we obtain the optimal aluminium ܣ஻כ
for Boeing as 
ܣ஻כ ൌ െ
ߙ
ͳ െ ߙ
ʹ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ ൅
ͳ
ʹܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ ଴ܲ
െ
ͳ
ʹܽଶሺͳ െ ߙሻଶ
ݓ
(57)
Thus, we obtain the optimal aircraft ܳ஻כ  for Boeing and ܳ஺כ  for 
Airbus: 
ܳ஻כ ൌ
ͳ
ʹ
൜ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ (58)
ܳ஺כ ൌ
ͳ
Ͷ
൜ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ܽሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ (59)
Therefore, in the Nash equilibrium, Boeing and Toray obtain 
the profits below. 
ߨ஻ ൌ
ʹ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ ൜
ʹ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ ൅ ݓ
ߙ
ͳ െ ߙ
െ ݌଴ൠ
൅
ͳ
ͺ
൜ ଴ܲ െ
ͳ
ߙሺͳ െ ߙሻ
ݓൠ
ଶ (60)
                   
ߨ் ൌ
ʹ
ͻ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻଶ (61)
3.3. Condition for success of exclusive contract 
Let us now look at the condition under which Boeing signs the 
exclusive contract offered by Toray. That condition requires 
that Boeing and Toray obtain higher profits in the exclusive 
contract case than that in the non-exclusive contract case. 
   Comparing Eqns. (36), (37), (60) and (61), the following 
conditions need to be met ߨ஻ா ൒ ߨ஻ே for Boeing and ߨ்ா ൒ ߨ்ே
for Toray, where, ߨ௜ா  and ߨ௜ே  is profits in the exclusive and 
non-exclusive contracts, respectively, for Boeing and Toray. 
 By satisfying both conditions, Toray offers the CFRP ܭഥ்஻
for satisfying the equations below; 
From ߨ஻ா ൒ ߨ஻ே,
ܭഥ்஻ ൑
ͳ
͵
ሺ݌଴ ൅ ʹܿሻ െ
ߙ
ͳ െ ߙ
ݓǡܭഥ்஻ ൒
ʹ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (62)
Additionally, from ߨ்ா ൒ ߨ்ே,
͸ െ ξʹʹ
ͳʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ ൑ ܭഥ்஻ ൑
͸ ൅ ξʹʹ
ͳʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (63)
Satisfying the above two equations, a boundary condition to 
sign the exclusive contract exists as 
ʹ
͵
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ ൑ ܭഥ்஻ ൑
͸ ൅ ξʹʹ
ͳʹ
ሺ݌଴ െ ܿሻ (64)
In this condition, Toray’s best offer is the sum of the quantity 
when Toray competes with its rival in a Cournot competition 
or slightly larger than that level. 
4. Conclusion 
Our results show that Toray had a greater incentive to offer 
larger amounts of production of CFRP than just the amount 
they would cover the rival’s production in the market, in which 
they had to accept reduced profits to be accepted by Boeing. 
This is good for Boeing because of the low price.  
In 2010, when Toray signed the contract to provide CFRP for 
Airbus A350XWB, Hexel and Cytec, in the US, were already 
supplying to Airbus. Thus, for supplying to Airbus, Toray was 
the third provider and needed to follow these two firms. To turn 
around this game, Toray needed to canters around obtaining the 
know-how in the Boeing phase. Our theoretical analysis 
suggests one possible scenario such that Toray joins the Airbus 
market to become the leader by applying the know-how from 
Boeing in the real world.  
Applying this strategy to the general case study of material 
providers, when new technology is innovated, the best response 
strategy is for the firm who provides it to become the largest 
firm and leader in that market by producing much amounts of 
production and reducing the price. This strategy induces higher 
profits for both material providers and users. The exclusive 
contract is the useful and rational strategy as “system lock-in.” 
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